Studies of restricted securities private placements have explained the difference between the price of stock sold to private investors and the issuer's contemporaneous stock price in the market with factors such as the information asymmetry between issuer management and buyers, the possible impending financial distress of the issuer, or control and monitoring services provided by the buyers. In this paper, the implications from the LiquiStat™ database of investor-to-investor trades in restricted securities are explored. The pricing discounts observed in these trades are proposed to be entirely due to the illiquidity of the shares sold. The LiquiStat data also provides evidence of investor preferences with regard to non-traded, illiquid warrants and options. Factors considered possibly related to the magnitude of the discounts are analyzed in the cross-sectional regression model.
Introduction
In the financial literature, liquidity studies typically investigate subtle differences in liquidity between asset classes or trading markets. Appraisers, on the other hand, often refer to a fixed standard of marketability, against which other securities should be measured. For common stock, the standard is "cash in three days." Private equity or restricted shares of public companies, then, are valued at a "discount for lack of marketability."
1 No one doubts that liquidity affects security prices, but the extent of the liquidity-effect is hotly debated. This white paper provides a brief overview of the literature on restricted stock private placement discounts, discusses the shortcomings of traditional private placement studies, proposes an alternative data-set, and suggests a possible way forward.
There is no commonly-accepted theoretical model of liquidity, although a few have been proposed. Conceptually, investors value liquidity and would rather hold liquid assets than illiquid ones. And investors are more concerned about being "locked in" with an investment the more likely it is to lose value during the period of illiquidity. Two main kinds of data have been suggested for determining liquidity discounts for equity:
restricted stock private placement data and pre-initial public offering data. The latter is beyond the scope of this white paper, which will focus on restricted stock data. 2 The lack of generally accepted methods for measuring the value of liquidity, or the value loss from illiquidity, is severe enough with respect to common equity. But it is worse still with respect to stock options or warrants. While several studies of illiquid share private placements have been available for appraisers, academics, and analystswhatever their shortcomings -no such studies of transactions in illiquid options or 1 Throughout this paper, the terms "liquidity discounts," "marketability discounts," and their equivalents are used synonymously. 2 While beyond the scope of this white paper, the highly-persuasive arguments against the pre-IPO approach in the Tax Court's en banc decision in McCord [McCord v. Comm'r, 120 T.C. No. 13 (May 13, 2003) .] should be noted by appraisers that use this method. The McCord decision sets a very high hurdle for anyone relying on the pre-IPO data as a primary approach to liquidity discounts in a tax case.
Information Asymmetry: the "Lemons" Problem
Akerlof, in a Nobel prize-winning paper, described the Lemons Problem as a combination of information asymmetry and adverse selection. 8 Noticing the wide disparity in price between new cars and cars that have just left the showroom, he suggested two differences between the situations: the amount of information the seller has about the car and the selection of cars being sold. When buying a new car, the buyer has almost exactly the same amount of information about that particular car as the seller (namely, very little). Also, the selection on any given lot can be assumed to be a random draw from the population of that brand. In other words, the seller has no incentive to sell a particular vehicle because has information that makes him question its value and, also, because the selection of vehicles have not been on the road yet, the process of "sorting"
good from bad cannot have begun yet.
When buying a used car, on the other hand, the buyer knows less about the car than the seller does (information asymmetry). The seller has owned and driven the car for months or years. The buyer knows this and also knows that the seller is more likely to sell if he knows that it is a bad car -a lemon (adverse selection). Akerlof showed that the buyer would tend to discount his offer price more than he would if information asymmetry was not a problem. 9 Myers & Majluf found that information asymmetry and adverse selection combined may cause firms to forego otherwise-attractive investment opportunities if they need outside capital to pursue them. 10 Investors know, or fear, that managers will want to raise capital if the stock price is "high" and avoid raising capital if the price is "low."
Therefore, they bid down the price of companies raising money.
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This, in turn, exacerbates the adverse selection problem. Empirical studies have shown that companies that issue shares in secondary public offerings tend to see their stock prices drop on announcement, consistent with the Lemons Problem theory. 12 Hertzel & Smith, in an extension of Myers & Majluf, explained private placement discounts as compensation to investors for costs they incur to reduce asymmetries of information. 13 They analyzed a sample of 106 private placements from the 1980-87 period with an overall average discount of 20 percent and a lower average discount for the registered shares. Testing their theory, they regressed the discount on measures associated with increased uncertainty about firm value, such as evidence of distress or high market-to-book ratios. However, they almost completely ignored the issue of liquidity as a contributor to the discount.
14 As an extension of the Hertzel & Smith analysis, Bajaj, et. al., studied a sample of private placements that included both registered and unregistered shares, with the explicit goal of providing separate estimates for the contributions of liquidity and information asymmetry, respectively. They analyzed 88 private placements, with an overall average discount of 22 percent. Because the registered shares sold at significant discounts, albeit lower than the unregistered shares, the authors concluded that the private placement discount had to be caused by factors other than illiquidity. They assumed, in other words, that these "shares can be transacted freely, and the fact that the firm was publicly traded meant there was a ready market for these shares." 15 They regressed the discount on a number of variables, all associated with information asymmetry or control issues, plus only one variable associated with liquidity (the dummy variable indicating that registered 12 See, for example, Asquith, P, and D. Mullins (1986), Equity issues and offering dilution, Journal of Financial Economics 15, 61-89. 13 Hertzel, M, and R. Smith (1993), Market discounts and shareholder gains for placing equity privately, Journal of Finance, 48, 459-485. 14 Ibid, p. 480. The impact of liquidity, or lack thereof, was discussed in a footnote to the paper. Noting that there are institutional investors that "do not value liquidity highly," the authors dismissed the idea that the incremental discount for the unregistered shares was due entirely to the illiquidity of the shares, but did not investigate further. 15 Bajaj, et. al., supra, p. 107. stock was sold). 16 The authors concluded, on the basis of this analysis, that the only portion of the private placement discount caused by lack of liquidity was 7.2 percent, on average. However, they also opined that the appropriate discount to apply for lack of marketability when determining the fair market value of minority interests in operating companies is the full private placement discount, or 22 percent on average.
17 16 It is interesting to note that this dummy-variable was used by Hertzel & Smith as a variable related to information asymmetry (because the "quality-signaling" effect to the market would be greater if the private investors are locked in through owning restricted stock). There is certainly nothing per se wrong with this. As Myers & Majluf put it, "a full description of corporate financing and investment behavior will no doubt require telling several stories at once." The private placement data is clearly quite "malleable" in the sense that the same sample of transactions can tell us many different stories. 17 Bajaj, et. al., supra, p. 114. "In our opinion, when valuing an operating company that is privately held (or its securities), the appropriate benchmark for discounts is provided by the total private placement discount or the discount observed in the acquisition approach." Note that the authors claim the "total" private placement discount, which might include both the "registered" and unregistered shares (average: 22%) should apply. However, if the goal is to find the right discount for fully-illiquid securities, it clearly makes the most sense to exclude any shares that were sold with registration pending or with registration rights from the analysis. This portion of their sample had an average discount of 28%.
Problems with the Private Placement Studies
The final conclusion of Bajaj, et. al.
-that the full private placement discount should apply to the value of private equity -is highly debatable. The standard of value relevant to readers of their paper is "fair market value" in the way this term is generally interpreted in a tax context. In the fair market value context, the identities of buyer and seller are supposed to be unknown, similar to the way stocks trade in the public markets. 18 In other words, they are supposed to be unknown to the valuation analyst.
Thus, any analysis of value that determines a price appropriate for the securities only in certain types of transactions or only between certain kinds of buyers or sellers is automatically suspect. The goal, at any rate, is to find the "consensus" price or the price which would be acceptable to the greatest diversity of buyers or sellers and in a variety of different transaction types. In particular, if we assume that the Lemons Problem is a serious consideration which weighs heavily on the transaction decisions of buyers in the PIPEs (Private Investments in Public Equity) market, the prices paid in such transactions would likely not apply in different circumstances.
The best reflection of the fair market value of a security would be an arm's-length trade between two investors that are anonymous and unaffiliated with the issuer. And in such a trade there would be no systematic tendency for information asymmetry to bias prices in one particular direction because there would be no Lemons Problem. 19 In fact, all of the alternative discount explanations are based on the assumption that private placements are sold at prices that are different from those at which an investor would buy the same shares with the same restrictions in ordinary market transactions. In other words, the 18 Courts have consistently held that the buyers and sellers assumed by the definition are "hypothetical" and have rejected analyses where the identities of buyer and seller are important to the outcome. 19 Note that it is an oversimplification to state that information asymmetry holds between buyers and sellers in normal market transactions: it almost never actually does. However, in normal market transactions, neither buyers nor sellers have any particular reason to suspect that the other side of the deal has more information than they do. (Sometimes it might be the buyer who has the most information; sometimes it might be the seller who has more information, with no particular tendency for it to go one way or the other). Also, as buyers and sellers have the same information, on average, there is no adverse selection problem. In other words, the seller is not selling because he is an insider and has access to material nonpublic information about this particular stock.
peculiarities of the private placement process produce pricing-effects that are unrelated to the market value of the stock. 20 If we were to accept the Bajaj, et. al., analysis in theory, the logical conclusion would be to eliminate any portion of the private placement discount truly caused by factors other than illiquidity from the total marketability discount.
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However, we should not accept any of these explanations without further scrutiny, especially since the studies tell very different stories with the same data and almost the same analysis. There are two inherent weaknesses of the private placement studies: (1) the lack of measurable parameters that are exclusively associated with either of the phenomena the researcher wishes to analyze: control and monitoring, information asymmetry, or the alleviation of capital scarcity; and (2) the impossibility of establishing two distinct data-sets, one completely liquid and one completely illiquid.
"Alternative Explanation" Parameters. It would be easy to tell stories using almost any of the variables analyzed in the private placement studies as an indicator for almost any one of the four discount explanations. As an example, Bajaj, et. al., propose that all of the following four variables are associated with information asymmetry and not with illiquidity: fraction of total shares placed, stock price volatility, the z-score, and total placement proceeds. However, the greater the fraction of total shares placed the more difficult it is to re-sell the shares after the placement. Thus, fraction of total shares placed is also associated with illiquidity. Also, in Wruck's telling, the fraction of shares placed is associated with increased ownership concentration and part of the control and monitoring story. Likewise, stock price volatility is associated with the effect of illiquidity: the greater the volatility, the greater the chance that a security will lose value. 20 And, to be sure, the typical arm's-length transaction analysts envision when attempting to determine "fair market value" of a fractional interest in a privately held operating company does not involve providing a huge cash infusion to the company, often to the tune of 10-20 percent of its market value, radically altering its balance sheet, growth outlook, and other financial and operating characteristics. 21 This analysis should apply in almost any appraisal context, except a valuation involving the issuance of new shares for new capital to the issuing firm or a trade between an inside seller and an outside buyer. This level of knowledge of the identities of buyer and seller is incompatible with both the "fair market value" and the "fair value" standards.
The exact same goes for the z-score: a lower z-score and higher bankruptcy risk makes investors crave liquidity more. Finally, total placement proceeds are greater the greater the market value of the firm. Larger firms are less risky, which reduces the discount for illiquidity. Reasonable arguments can support several explanations for the discount.
They are all plausible stories; none of them dominates.
Registration Variables. A more significant problem is the inability of the registration dummy variable to capture the entire difference between liquid and illiquid securities.
Consider, first, the fact that in Hertzel & Smith's and Wruck's telling the registration variable is part of the information asymmetry and control and monitoring stories, respectively. Secondly, consider the facts of life for investors in private equity: there is no such thing as privately placed stock that is completely liquid. The SEC discourages private sales of already-registered shares. Thus, the stock flagged as "registered" in the private placement studies was probably not registered prior to the placement (Hertzel & Smith states the shares were either registered or sold with registration "pending"). It is also conceivable that some of the shares placed merely had registration rights. 22 Most importantly, the average fraction of total shares placed was more than 15 percent on average for the studies reviewed here. This large block size is enough to induce liquidity constraints on resale after the private placement, regardless of registration status.
The alternative explanations for the private placement discount are well-supported by both logic and empirical data, and they likely explain at least part of the discount.
However, the studies cannot accurately measure the discount portion caused by factors other than illiquidity. There may also be facets to the pricing of private placements that are still unexplored. For example, private investors sometimes get board seats or other valuable elements of control over the issuer. They might pay more because of these additional features. This, then, would tend to reduce the observed private placement 22 Shares sold with registration "pending" are still subject to SEC review of the registration statement, which can be lengthy and might never result in an effective registration statement. Shares sold with either demand or "piggyback" registration rights depend on the issuer's willingness and ability to live up to its promise to register the shares. In either case, the period of illiquidity can be lengthy and uncertain.
discount. In other words, the average illiquidity "portion" of the discount might be higher than the average total discount observed in the studies.
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In summary, when comparing the "pure" illiquidity discount with the private placement discount, it seems that the former may be higher, lower, or the same as the latter, depending on facts and circumstances. And it is very hard to tell which way it goes for the average issuer or the average transaction, by reviewing the private placement data alone.
Post-Deal Performance
If investors are adequately compensated for their private placements investments, they should earn above-market (or at least market) returns on their investments during the period of illiquidity. However, this does not appear to be the case. Hertzel, et. al., find that companies that issue equity privately tend to under-perform the market indexes, on a risk-adjusted basis. 24 This is unexpected, since the announcement effect is positive.
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Chu, et. al., (in a paper coauthored by this author) also found that investors in private placements did poorly. 26 In this sample, the private investors underperformed the riskadjusted index, even when taking the discount into account. Due to the higher average betas of private placement firms, the significant discounts taken "may nonetheless be too small to compensate investors on a risk-adjusted basis."
27
Clearly, the private placement process has facets, beyond just illiquidity, that affect discounts. The solution, or at least part of the solution, might be to take a look at the 23 So, in a simplified example, if a private placement was done at a 30% discount from market price, while the purchaser got control features worth 15% (of the same base), then, ignoring all of the other discount explanations, the "true" illiquidity discount was 45%. 24 Hertzel, M., M. Lemmon, J. Linck, and L. Rees (2002) Long-run performance following private placements of equity, Journal of Finance, 57, 2595-2617. 25 Both Wruck and Hertzel & Smith found that the announcement effect was positive, i.e., when companies announce a private placement, the stock price showed significant abnormal returns across the announcement window. 26 Ibid, at p. 74. 27 Ibid, at p. 81.
Theoretical Models
The illiquidity discount data can also be used to test the available theoretical models for illiquidity discounts. The three models we test are developed by Longstaff, Finnerty, and Tabak.
First, Longstaff proposes a model of the "upper bound" on the discount, based on the well-known pricing formula for a lookback option. 28 The discount, in this model, is purely a function of the time remaining until the end of the illiquidity period and the volatility of the stock. The model assumes that investors have perfect market timing ability. The formula for the percent discount (d) is given below:
, where σ = the volatility of the stock; and T = period of illiquidity remaining. The volatility used in the formula, as in standard option pricing formulas, is the annualized standard deviation of return on the stock.
The Longstaff formula calculates the largest discount possible for a given security in a market of rational investors, assuming that illiquidity was the only thing causing the discount. Longstaff attempted to test the model against average discounts from restricted stock private placement studies. He found that the observed discounts were close to the upper bound, assuming that the average volatility for private placement companies are in the 25-35 percent range and that the average holding period for restricted stock in the studies was 2 years. However, for the older restricted stock studies (mostly performed during the 1960s -1980s), the average effective holding periods may have been higher than 2 years. More importantly, the average stock price volatility for companies placing equity privately was almost certainly higher than the 25-35 percent range during this period. More recent studies show that companies placing stock privately are more volatile than the average public company.
Finnerty proposes a model for the discount based on the pricing-formula for averageprice put options, also known as "Asian" options. 29 This model does not assume any special market timing abilities on the part of the investor. The model derives an upper bound for the discount, as follows:
, where 
Restricted Stock and Private Placements
There are three kinds of data reviewed in this white paper: the aforementioned private placement studies, which analyze private placements of both restricted and registered shares; restricted stock private placement studies, which exclude registered or soon-to-be registered shares; and pure investor-to-investor restricted stock transaction data (not 
SIDEBAR
Most of the studies, in other words, pertain to restricted shares subject to an almost completely different regulatory framework than the one that exists today (the most comprehensive of the earlier studies, the SEC's Institutional Investor study from 1967, was performed before Rule 144 became effective). As a result, their conclusions should be applied to restricted shares today only with extreme care and adjusting for the differences in liquidity for restricted stock today and in the past. The studies also generally show higher discounts for riskier issuers and for larger fractions of total shares placed.
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The key provision of Rule 144 is to require a holding period before a purchaser of restricted stock can sell it in the public markets. The holding period is currently one year (was two years prior to April 1997). This provision is necessary for the seller to show that he is not acting as an "underwriter" and, thus, is eligible for the 4(1) exemption, which is meant to apply only to persons who are not participating in a distribution of shares to the public. Furthermore, after the holding period, restricted stock sales to the public are subject to the volume limit provisions of the Rule. During any three month period a restricted stock holder cannot sell more than the greater of one percent of total shares outstanding or the weekly average trading volume during the four weeks prior to the sale. Also, if the issuer at any time fails to file all of the financial statements required for public companies, the 4(1) exemption is not available to its shareholders until it is again-current on its filings. In other words, restricted stock holders will "stuck" -even if they have held their shares for more than a year -if the issuer fails to file timely its 10Ks, 10Qs, or other required filings. Furthermore, the seller has to comply with certain manner of sale, reporting, and notice requirements of the Rule. The Rule has been amended several times since its promulgation in 1974.
SIDEBAR
There are, generally, two ways to sell securities legally in the United States: file an effective "1933 Act" registration statement and sell the stock to the public or sell the stock in reliance on an exemption from the registration requirement. The "4 (1)" exemption allows for resale to the public of privately issued restricted stock and is available to investors who comply with Rule 144. Such sales effectively end the period of illiquidity. The other major exemption of interest to holders of restricted stock is the so-called "4 (1-½)" exemption. This allows the holder to sell his restricted stock privately, under certain tightly controlled circumstances, to an accredited investor (see sidebar). Sales under this exemption are the subject of the next section.
Empirical Analysis -Restricted Stock

Transaction Sample
The data analyzed herein is from the LiquiStat™ database of private sales transactions. and sellers tend to be hedge funds, institutions, or other accredited investors. The dataset for this analysis was 61 trades in restricted common equity, with no warrants attached and nothing changing hands except cash for stock. Both buyers and sellers were the beneficiary of due diligence performed by the firm facilitating the sale, and by legal counsel. In particular, the ownership history of the stock was known, which would allow both buyer and seller, in each case, to estimate with precision the number of days of illiquidity remaining for each block of stock.
The due diligence performed for each trade, however, was limited to information about the rights, preferences, privileges, and restrictions, as well as the ownership history, of each block of restricted shares. In addition, we can assume that both buyer and seller had access to public data on the securities, including trading price and volume histories, stock price volatilities, and similar information typically instantly available to sophisticated investors. However, the investors were not affiliated with the issuer and did not have access to any material non-public information about the issuer. 36 Until each transaction is 34 The LiquiStat database is a compilation and analysis of restricted securities trading data, licensed to Pluris Valuation Advisors LLC from Green Drake Capital Corp., its affiliate. The database currently spans 140 transactions (mostly warrants) over approximately 18 months. More information is available at www.plurisvaluation.com/liquistat. 35 Restricted Stock Partners, of New York, New York, is a division of Green Drake Capital Corp., member NASD/SIPC. Restricted Stock Partners has created the Restricted Securities Trading Network (RSTN). The RSTN is believed to be the largest trading network for restricted securities anywhere, with more than 200 institutions and accredited investors as members. More information is available at www.restrictedsecurities.net. 36 Note that this is contrary to the private placement process, where such non-public information is routinely provided to prospective investors. The fact that management often provides investors with nonpublic information during the due diligence process before a private placement, however, should not be interpreted as implying that this information exchange eliminates information asymmetry from the priced, buyers and sellers were unknown to each other: the only thing they knew about each other was whether or not the seller was an affiliate of the issuer. In the sample reviewed here, there were no affiliate sellers. In other words, we can assume information symmetry between buyer and seller. 37 See Appendix 3 for more on how the RSTN process works.
Each RSTN transaction is made through a time-and date-stamped restricted securities order. This allowed Pluris to determine with precision the market reference price at the exact point each restricted stock trade was made. This is in sharp contrast with private placement studies where the time of pricing of each transaction is almost always unknown. 38 At a minimum, the resulting uncertainty regarding the market reference price introduces random "noise" to the private placement discount samples. process. Insiders will always know more than outside investors. Also, outside investors will always suspect that management's presentation of facts is selective and designed to put a positive "spin" on current operations and future prospects. 37 Information asymmetry would tend to hold, on average. 38 The private placement and restricted stock studies solve this problem in different ways. The exact date of the private placement is often unknown. And even if it is known it would be difficult to be certain when the placement was actually priced (it may have been priced at any point in time before closing). The best solution, therefore, may be to use some average price for the month or week of the transaction. This is the approach used by the FMV restricted stock study, the most comprehensive recent database available (continuously updated data). Alternatively, many of the private placement studies use a set date after the announcement date (assuming this date can be ascertained with precision), usually T+10, following Hertzel & Smith. This method, it is assumed, will factor in the expected stock price appreciation on announcement (the positive announcement effect). Needless to say, all of these methods are imprecise ways of determining the market reference price for each placement. Some of the errors may cancel themselves out across large samples. However, the added "noise" will tend to reduce the utility of smaller samples.
See Table 1 The average discount for the LiquiStat database is 32.8 percent, as shown in Table 1 . This is greater than the average discounts seen in most private placement and restricted stock studies. The standard deviation of the sample is 14.9 percent. The median discount is Ibid., p. 14. Finnerty also reports discounts measured relative to the stock price 10 days prior to the announcement. The average discount for the "10 days prior" measure was 18.41 percent, which is not statistically significantly different from the "day prior" measure. 40 Ibid., p. 107. Bajaj also reports that the average discount for registered issues was 14 percent and the average discount for unregistered issues was 28 percent. 41 This test was not possible for the Finnerty or Bajaj data, as it was not available. The FMV data is available online. Note: a, b, and c = significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. n = not significant at the 10% level.
Given the much higher average discounts in the LiquiStat sample -despite an average time period of restrictions left of only 138 days -we would expect the LiquiStat sample to show significantly greater mean and median volatility numbers than the private placement studies. If we assume that the private placement samples have longer expected restriction periods than the LiquiStat sample, the most likely explanation for the higher discounts in the LiquiStat sample is higher risk. However, this does not seem to be the case.
As shown in Table 2 the volatility of the FMV sample is higher than the LiquiStat sample (again, only at the 10 percent level of significance). As previously noted, the FMV sample, because it is continuously updated, is the only one that covers time periods close to those of the LiquiStat sample. If we can assume a minimum illiquidity period of one year for the restricted stock studies versus only 138 days in the LiquiStat database, and similar volatility levels, the significantly higher discounts in the LiquiStat sample is surprising.
Several explanations are possible, including:
(1) The measurement errors associated with the uncertain market reference price for private placements may result in systematic downward biases for the discount.
(2) Factors other than illiquidity may be at play in the private placement process that systematically reduce the observed discount (more than offsetting the additions to the discount from information or other effects). This might include control or other features granted to investors.
(3) The actual expected illiquidity periods for the shares sold in the private placement studies may have been significantly shorter than the 1 year (or 2 years in older studies) Rule 144 illiquidity period.
The last explanation might be the most convincing one. PIPE investments have become highly popular partly because issuers often register the stock shortly after the private placement. When investing, PIPE buyers have fairly strong visibility over how long they will have to wait for the shares to be registered. However, those details are not always available to the authors of private placement studies. Thus, whether or not stock is issued with registration rights, or even a promise of registration very shortly after the placement, may be unknown. This, if true, would tend to overstate the actual expected period of illiquidity for the shares in the studies. The possibility that the shares in the LiquiStat study are riskier than those in other studies cannot be rejected, of course.
There may be aspects of the perceived riskiness of a stock issue that is not captured by the volatility of stock returns. However, based on this evidence, it is more plausible that private placement studies include a too-great fraction of issues where the issuer has promised registration very shortly after the placement. In other words, the average "holding periods" of the private placement studies may be lower than the one (or two)
year Rule 144 period and might even be lower than the roughly 4 months of the LiquiStat database.
Cross-Sectional Analysis
The buyers and sellers are anonymous to each other on the RSTN. Also, because buyers and sellers are non-affiliates, they can be assumed to have no material nonpublic information about the issuing firms and to have the same amount of information on average (information symmetry, in the average case). Thus, we can assume that there are no significant information effects on pricing. Likewise, since these transactions result in no new capital and no changes to the ownership structure of issuing firms, capital scarcity and control and monitoring effects can be ignored. Thus, the analysis is limited to variables associated with the value of liquidity.
The period of illiquidity remaining for each block of stock sold was measured as a function of (1) the 356 day holding period necessary to take advantage of Rule 144, (2) the time since the stock was purchased from the issuer, and (3) any evidence that the issuer might register the shares and, thus, allow for resale earlier than expected under
Rule 144. Because of the importance of this variable to both buyers and sellers in the restricted stock "market," this information is very well documented and these measures are assumed to be precise. As will be further explained below, we are using the cubicroot of the number of days remaining of illiquidity ("Root of Days" in Table 3 ) as our independent variable. The predicted sign of the coefficient is positive.
Stock price volatility ("Variance" in Table 3 ) was measured as the variance (σ 2 ) of the continuously compounded return on the stock, measured daily over one year, or since public trading began if less than a year prior to the transaction, and annualized. Stock price volatility is a factor in both the Longstaff and Finnerty models and is logically an important driver of the illiquidity discount. The greater the volatility of a stock, the greater is the possibility for losses during the period of illiquidity (or, alternatively, the greater opportunity for trading gains if the holder is free to trade the stock). Thus, the predicted sign of the coefficient is positive. As an alternative measure of the riskiness of the security, we use two dummy variables for indicating either very low stock prices (less than $2 per share) or very high stock prices (more than $20 per share) which would tend
to have a quality-signaling effect to the market ("Low Price" and "High Price" in Table   3 ). The predicted signs of the coefficient are negative for High Price and positive for Low Price.
The trading volume of the stock is an indication of how difficult it will be to sell the block after the period of illiquidity is over. For most of the transactions in the database, the blocks are not large enough to cause liquidity constraints under Rule 144, which allows for resale after the holding period is over of one percent of the issuer's shares outstanding every calendar quarter. However, even if there are no legal volume limits, if trading volume is too low relative to the block size, it might still limit a block seller's ability to turn shares into cash quickly without impacting the market price. To see if this
is an important factor, we have additionally regressed the discount on a dummy variable set to 1 if the block size sold was greater than 5 days' of market trading volume ("Sharesto-Volume" in Table 3 ). The predicted sign is positive. Table 3 shows the result of the cross-sectional regression analysis. All of the coefficients have the expected sign. The R 2 is 0.598 and the standard error is 0.099. The F-statistic, at 16.36, is significant at the 1 percent level. The individual t-statistics indicate that the all of the coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level, except Low Price which is significant at the 10 percent level. All t-statistics and standard errors reported are heteroscedasticity-robust.
Discount Time-Decay
In the sample, the discount shows a significant, positive relationship with the days of illiquidity remaining, consistent with the idea that the illiquidity of the shares is a significant driver of the discount. The data may also be consistent with the findings of Amihud & Mendelson, who found a "clientele" effect where investors who place a high value on liquidity will tend to own short-term and highly liquid securities, while investors who place a lower value on liquidity tend to own less liquid securities. 42 This clientele effect suggests that asset returns may be an increasing, but concave, function of illiquidity. Extended to the marketability discount itself, we would further hypothesize that the discount would be an increasing but concave function of the days left to liquidity.
Running separate regressions of the discount with days remaining, the square root of days remaining, and the cubic-root of days remaining, reveals a better fit with the cubic-root of days remaining. Note that the concavity of the discount-illiquidity period curve (and, presumably, the "clientele" effect) is consistent with the upper-bound formula of 
Pricing Model Tests
As a means of testing the theoretical models, predicted discounts were calculated for each transaction in the LiquiStat database using all three theoretical models. Descriptive statistics for each set of predicted discounts -along with the actual discounts measuredare presented in Table 4 below.
None of the theoretical models performs well against this data-set. The averages of the predicted discounts differ from the average of the actual discounts by more than 20
percentage points in each case. 43 The Longstaff and Tabak models generate several predicted discounts that are higher than 100 percent and almost 100 percent, respectively, which is obviously inappropriate. The two models provide high discounts because of the relatively high level of volatility of the stocks in this sample. 44 However, while higher than the average for public companies, this level of volatility is fairly normal for companies issuing stock privately. This should serve as a note of caution against using these models to estimate discounts (instead of just the upper bound). The output from the Finnerty model is more "reasonable" in the sense that it consistently provides discounts below 100 percent. However, the range indicated by the Finnerty formula is much too low to describe the LiquiStat discounts. The maximum indicated discount is 36.6 percent, which is close to the median of the actual discounts. (Likewise, the top of the interquartile range of the Finnerty model results is below the bottom of the interquartile range of actual results.) The very low discount indications from the Finnerty formula is a reflection of the relatively short periods of illiquidity for the transactions in 43 In addition, the Wilcoxon rank sum test is used to test the null hypothesis that the distributions of the predicted discounts from the theoretical models are the same as the actual discount distribution. The test results are that the predicted discounts are statistically different from the actuals, in each case. 44 The fact that the median predicted discount for the Longstaff model, which to some extent eliminates the effect of the large "right-tail" outliers, is much closer to the actual median (closer than the averages) indicates that the Longstaff formula might be more effective at lower volatilities.
the LiquiStat sample. The Finnerty model might be more effective at determining discounts for longer holding-period samples.
Summary: Implications for Restricted Stock Valuations
It is quite impossible to disentangle the illiquidity discount from the other portions of the private placement discount and measuring each part separately with any precision. Thus, the myriad of considerations affecting the pricing of private placements raise serious questions about the usefulness of this data for determining liquidity discounts. The lack of precise measurements of the overall discount and the lack of certainty regarding registration rights for private placements are further incentives to develop alternative approaches. However, the data analyzed here does not lend support to the idea that private placement discounts are "too high" to reflect solely the effect of illiquidity. The
LiquiStat data may even indicate that private placement discounts are too low to adequately reflect the price of illiquidity. If so, that would be consistent with studies indicating that investors in companies that raise equity privately do poorly. Whether or not this continues to be the case as the LiquiStat database grows will be explored in future versions of this white paper.
The theoretical liquidity discount models may serve as "upper bounds" in some cases and as direct discount estimates in others. Much more study is necessary, but preliminary indications are that the Longstaff and Tabak models should only be used to derive discounts for stocks that are significantly less volatile than those analyzed herein. Also, the Finnerty model would likely only be effective at deriving discounts for significantly longer holding periods than those typical of the dataset analyzed here.
Options, Warrants, and Illiquidity
The empirical evidence so far presented on the issue of illiquidity discounts for equity securities may be woefully inadequate -by contrast, the empirical evidence on illiquidity discounts for derivative instruments is non-existent. The LiquiStat database, to the best of our knowledge, is the first attempt at improving this situation. Intrinsic Value and "Moneyness". In-the-money options have positive intrinsic value, meaning they would yield a profit if exercised (i.e., the stock price is greater than the strike price). An option's value over and above its intrinsic value is called its "time value" (or, because most options have positive time values, its "option premium" or "time premium"). The "moneyness" of an option can be defined as the fraction of its stock price over its strike price (S/K). In practical analysis, since S/K is not a particularly "well behaved" variable, ln(S/K) can be used instead.
Delta. An option's delta is the relationship between the option value and the stock price.
It is defined as N(d 1 ) in the Black-Scholes formula (see above) for the standard call option.
Cashless Exercise. This feature, quite common in both option and warrant contracts, allows the holder to exercise the warrant without paying any cash. The warrant or option is net-settled with stock equal to the total intrinsic value of the warrant or option at exercise. Cashless exercise may also be granted subject to certain conditions, for example a time limit or only after certain criteria are met. 
Call-Caps and
Illiquidity and Exercise Behavior
Thus far, most of the work published on illiquid options and warrants focus on the behavior of holders of illiquid stock options (mostly, employee stock options). The conclusions from these studies were important in framing the debate over SFAS 123 and its revised version. Kulatilaka and Marcus note that a holder who wants to reduce his option position would sell part of the position. 
Government Views
Government regulation plays a part in the valuation of stock options for both financial accounting and tax accounting purposes. The standard of value in financial accounting matters is "fair value," while the standard of value in tax matters is "fair market value."
This is relevant to the discussion, since the "fair value" compensation expenses associated with a company's stock option grant program may be different from the fair market value of the options issued (expenses to the company different from the utility and The FASB's position is based on the empirical research (noted above) on early-exercise patterns. It remains to be seen whether or not Finnerty's model -which more accurately reflects the fair market value of the options granted -will be accepted in financial statements under SFAS 123R. 53 Some of the difference in methods is due to different value premises: the difference in focus between estimating the cost, to the issuer, of the services received from its employees or others and the fair market value to the option grant recipient -i.e., what the options would trade for, including all their restrictions, in an arm's-length trade between a willing buyer and willing seller, neither of whom being under any compulsion to trade.
Empirical Analysis -Warrants
Transaction Sample
The data analyzed herein is from the LiquiStat™ database of private sales transactions on the Restricted Securities Trading Network. LiquiStat and the RSTN have been described above (see Section 7). The sample analyzed in this version of this white paper included 76 transactions in non-traded warrants, exercisable for shares of publicly traded companies. It is immediately apparent from the table that the average discount is higher than for restricted stock and that the range is wider. For options and warrants, the illiquidity discount can be expected to vary significantly, depending on how far in the money the warrant is. This is because the intrinsic value of the warrant can often be immediately realized by the holder by exercising early. Only the time-value portion of the warrant's value requires a holding period. Thus, illiquidity is a much more severe value detriment for out-of-the-money options and warrants. As shown in Table 5 , the average intrinsic value is significantly higher for warrants in the low-discount quintiles, while the average moneyness is significantly lower for warrants in the high-discount quintiles.
Other Discount Indications
In the LiquiStat database, illiquidity discounts are calculated from both (a) the theoretical The model yields a lower value than the Black-Scholes formula (the call cap reduces the value of the warrant). The discounts from the barrier-option values tend to be somewhat lower on average than the discounts from the full Black-Scholes value for options without call caps. This may indicate that investors do not believe the issuer will exercise its option to redeem the warrants even if the call cap is significantly exceeded. Thus, call cap warrants may be valued using a direct comparison with discounts for other call cap warrants, or with a regression analysis of the entire LiquiStat database, with a dummy variable or other signifier to measure the effect on the discount from the Black-Scholes values due to the presence of a call cap provision.
The Key to Accurate Valuation of Illiquid Assets
How do you value assets when there is no public marketplace for them?
You'll need a valuation firm with in-depth experience and access to the most up-to-date real-world data. Pluris Valuation Advisors was created to meet this need.
Pluris specializes in valuing illiquid assets, such as restricted securities and stock options. Valuation needs Pluris can help fill include:
Portfolio Valuations.
Pluris values restricted stock, warrants and other illiquid securities for investment banks, hedge funds and other investment funds, or other reporting entities.
Financial Reporting Valuations.
Pluris provides valuations of stock option grants and non-vested shares of reporting entities, as well as valuations of complex derivatives for disclosure and accounting purposes.
Tax Valuations.
Pluris values illiquid securities and other assets for estate tax, gift tax and income tax returns.
Transaction Opinions.
Pluris provides fairness and solvency opinions needed as part of the due diligence process for corporate transactions.
Litigation Support.
Pluris provides shareholder litigation support services when expert assistance is required.
Using a professional valuation firm can help ensure that you have valuations that are not only fair and accurate, but defensible.
Pluris is the key to all of your illiquid-asset valuation needs. Contact Pluris today at 212-248-4500 or info@PlurisValuation.com. 
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